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CASE NOTES
very dangers recognized as existing when the insider is the optionee are
also present, although admittedly to a somewhat lesser degree, when he
chooses to speculate through the writing of these options.
More substantial profits and less risk are perhaps attainable if the
insider himself purchases and sells puts and calls, but he may well be
subject to the restrictions of section 16(b), 2t which in the light of this
decision, he avoids by the issuance of a straddle. In view of the present
opinion, the essential thing about the act of exercising the option would
seem to be not that the insider has committed himself and cannot withdraw,
but rather the mere state of bilateral contractual certainty. It is unfortunate
if, in reaching this result, the court was influenced by the contention that
Landa had no control over the exercise of the option, and that "far from
allowing an insider to indulge in the speculation proscribed by section
16(b), the issuance of a straddle places him in a strait-jacket." 22 Perhaps
liability should not be contingent on the exercise of the option when the
insider is the optionee and when, for speculative purposes, he has already
made, so to speak, his last move by binding himself to a unilateral contract.
In conclusion, given the strict adherence to contract terminology by the
court in interpreting the relevant provisions of the act, the Securities and
Exchange Commission should adopt remedial regulations under the power
given to it in section 9(b),23 whereby the Commission has the power to
adopt rules dealing with all aspects of the use of put and call options. As
of this date, however, the Commission has not seen fit to exercise this
power.24 In the long view however, further acceptance of this rigid inter-
pretation will not only severely hamper the effectiveness of the act, but
may relegate the Commission to the more unsatisfactory alternative of
retrospective response by administrative decree to each new and ingenious
speculative scheme.
NORMAN JACOBS
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Justification of a Dis-
count' Based upon a Reduced Brokerage.—Thomasville Chair Co. v.
FTC.'—The petitioner brought this action to set aside a cease and desist
order of the respondent, the Federal Trade Commission. The order was issued
to curb Thomasville's pricing schedule which granted a five per cent discount
21 Comment, Put and Call Options Under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act, 69 Yale L.J. 868, 894 (1960). It is therein suggested that it is "unlikely"
that insider option writing will develop into a "widespread" problem. This is no doubt
true because the successful issuance of puts and calls requires rather extensive holdings
so as to allow the speculator to deal in averages and thus protect himself from any
miscalculation. Nevertheless, the relatively smaller profits available to the insider-writer
of the option, and even the infrequency of this manner of speculation, in no way requires
the result reached in the Landa case.
22 Brief for Appellee, p. 13.
23 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1958),
24 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 22,621 (1958).
1 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
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to the class of customers whose average purchase of furniture on a yearly .
basis amounted to $50,000 or eight carloads. 2 Sales to this group brought
a commission of three per cent to Thomasville salesmen while purchases by
another class carried a six per cent commission. The FTC found that in some
instances the discount to the former was only possible because of the lower
commission and held this to be a violation of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Acts The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the order
and remanded the matter. HELD: A reduced price resulting in part from a
lower commission to the seller's agent is not necessarily illegal, but such
lower brokerage must be examined to determine whether it is justifiable. The
court stated that a seller's brokerage payment to his agent can be dictated not
only by a desire to attain an order by giving a favored customer a reduced
price, but also by the legitimate estimation of the proper brokerage ap-
propriate to a classification of customers. While the former is illegal since it
is an "ad hoc" discriminatory maneuver, in the latter instance the seller is
performing a fair pricing function.4
 A lower charge to a buyer based upon a
legitimate reduction of commission is a fair response to the seller's cost.
The theory behind the FTC case is simply that "Section 2(c) makes un-
lawful petitioner's discriminatory discounts granted to its favored customers
in lieu of all or part of the commissions of its sales representatives." 0 This
section of the law was passed by Congress to combat the use of brokerage
devices for concealment of price discrimination.° The wording of the law
condemns any payment or discount in lieu of payment of brokerage between
opposing parties. This especially envisioned the pressure a large buyer would
bring against a seller to lower his price by not paying a brokerage fee to his
own agent, or allowing the buyer to perform services normally rendered by a
broker. Small purchasers incapable of exerting such pressure and unable to
provide such services paid a higher price. The large number of cases involving
brokerage payments attest to the key purpose of the subsection.?
Not clearly covered in the law is the function of commission payments
to one's own agents. Adjustments of this might seem to be within the cost
regulation of a product. Part of the Robinson-Patman bill is a general
proscription of discriminatory pricing, subsection (a).° Included in this
subsection is a proviso allowing a defense based upon demonstrated savings
2 The case also presents a factual issue as to determining the cost justification defense
on these classifications, id. at 543-44.
a 49 Stat. 1526 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c) (1958). Pertinent parts are:
. . . it shall be unlawful for any person .. . to pay or grant .. . a com-
mission ... or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof
• . in connection with the sale ... of goods, wares, or merchandise ... to the
other party to such transaction, . . .
4 "It thus becomes necessary for the commission to permit a full scale inquiry
. as to whether the company's long standing contract with its salesmen under which
they received a smaller commission for sales to this list of customers could be legally
justified." 306 F.2d at 545.
5 Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
6 Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 331 (1962).
7 Great Att. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1939); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
s 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1958).
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which came from methods of production or distribution. Originally, in the
Senate version, brokerage was excluded from this defense .° Senator Logan, the
floor manager of the bill, objected to this exclusion stressing that the bill
had in mind only "sham brokerage."i° In the final version, the express
exclusion of brokerage was struck out for a reason subject to alternate
interpretations."
Characteristic of the original cases brought under subsection (c) was
the absolute, per se impact given to the subsection.12
 It did not matter what
form the transfer of brokerage possessed,' 3
 nor did it matter what services
were provided in return." If the courts or the Commission found that a
brokerage or discount in lieu thereof had passed from seller to buyer or
buyer's agent, then the transaction was void. Always argued and always
struck down was the contention that if the brokerage was paid to the buyer
because of savings he afforded to the seller—the cost justification defense to
subsection (a)—such should be permitted. It has been continuously concluded
(even the Thomasville court pays homage to this) that the cost justification
defense of subsection (a) does not apply to subsection (c)."
Not until FTC v. Henry Brock & Co." was a discount based on a seller's
adjustment of brokerage vis-à-vis his own agent held illegal. Immediately
prior to that case something of a chink was found in the armor of the sub-
section in Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc." This was a suit to recover
a lost commission. After dismissing the plaintiff as a salesman, the seller
passed the unpaid commission on to the buyer in the form of a lower price.
The court upheld the reduction of the price since the seller was free to totally
eliminate the salesman and hence reduce his costs. 18
The crucial decision regarding the illegality of internal brokerage
9
 S. Rep, No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
10
 This discussion appears in the Senate hearings on section 2(c). Hearing Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
.52 (1936):
Witness: When times get dull we make contracts with big manufacturers to take
our goods at lower cost . . , That cost has to come out of our selling cost, and
I understand you cannot deduct brokerage.
Senator Logan: You can deduct legitimate brokerage. This sham brokerage
is what this bill is aimed at. It is perfectly proper under this bill to pay and
deduct legitimate brokerage.
11
 H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936): "The words 'other than
brokerage' which appeared in the Senate amendment are eliminated . . . for the
reason that the matter of brokerage is dealt with in a subsequent subsection of the Bill."
The majority opinion in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co. 363 U.S. 166, 171 n.8 (1960) states
that "The legislative history is barren of any indication that a change in substance was
intended." The minority finds just the contrary. 363 U.S. at 186 n.11.
12 Subsection (c) "prohibition . . .• is absolute." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
FTC, supra note 7, at 674.
13 Quality Bakers v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1941).
14 Fitch v. Kentucky-Tenn. Light & Power, 136 Fid 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
15 "[Me prohibitions of Section 2(c) are to be read independently . . . ." 306 F.2d
at 545.
16 Supra note 11.
11 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
18 This ruling was given explicit blessing in the Broch case, supra note 11, at 176
n.18.
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manipulation must be, excluding the instant case, the Broth decision.
There, the FTC declared illegal the seller's attempt to lower the commission
he paid to his salesman so as to meet a price requested by one special buyer.
The Supreme Court overruled the circuit court by holding that the subsection
was sufficiently broad to prohibit indirect payment of brokerage. As framed
in the FTC ruling, the economic effect is judged to be the same both where
a commission is paid directly to the buyer and where the seller's broker is
paid a smaller commission, thus enabling the seller to reduce his price to a
particular buyer.") While it may be apparent that the economic effect is the
same, it was not apparent to the Supreme Court that parallel effects produced
parallel illegality. The Broch Court split five to four on the application of
subsection (c) to seller-agent arrangements. The dissenting justices urged
that the subsection was not intended to regulate brokerage between seller
and seller's agent or buyer and buyer's agent when services are rendered."
The most interesting facet of the decision however, was the bone tossed
to commerce in the form of dicta by the majority. In the opinion Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that a price reduction following a lowered brokerage fee is
not always illegal, but falls under the subsection ". . . only when given to
favored customers."2 ' "The majority reserved the right to make a different
finding on the appropriate facts." 22
It is this bone which the Thomasville court seizes and, so to speak,
adds meat when finding a possibility that such facts exist here. 23 The
manner of determining justification of reduced brokerage in the 'case is not
so crucial as is the fact that the court clearly and unequivocally states that
it may be found. Yet, it is intriguing to notice the process which the court
uses. To take the discount based on brokerage out of the prohibition of the
law, the court finds that there was no discrimination. 21
 It was in the Broch
case that the Supreme Court first held that "discriminatory pricing" was at
the heart of subsection (c). 25
 It had previously been held that in subsection
(c) violations, discrimination need not be proven. 26 The dissent in the Broch
decision arguing against . the factual distinction presented by the majority
restated the irrelevancy of discrimination as a factor in the case, stressing
that the decision would lead to the destruction of the independence of sub-
sections (a) and (c).
What Thomasville brings out, in accord with Broth, is that a discount
in lieu of brokerage is not always discriminatory. The Thomasville court
tells the FTC to find first that the brokerage reduction is unjustifiable, and
12 Henry Broch & Co., FTC docket No. 6484 (Dec. 10, 1957).
20 363 U.S. at 181.
21
 Id. at 176. "A price reduction based upon alleged savings in brokerage is an
`allowance in lieu of brokerage' when given only to favored customers."
22 Id. at 177 n.19. "We need not view this administrative practice as laying down
an absolute rule that Section 2(c) is violated by the passing on of savings in broker's
commissions to direct buyers . . ."
23 The case was remanded for rehearing on this principle.
24 306 F.2d at 545.
25 363 U.S. at 177.
20 Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938).
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only then may it consider whether the discount is a violation of subsection
(c)
While the court is not clear as to the guidelines for this new method of
determining subsection (c) violations, it still takes pains to avoid the snare
of fusing the defense of subsection (a) with subsection (c).27 The court's
position is not as artificial as it may appear. It was argued in the respondent's
brief that the mere fact that the conduct in question is nonviolative of sub-
section (a) does not preclude its violation of subsection (c). 28 Something of
the converse may also be true, that if a business practice clearly falls within
the sanction of subsection (a) it must so remain and not be invalidated
because, in form though not in substance, it is described in subsection (c).2°
With the Thomasville decision, it is now necessary to determine whether the
brokerage rate was an internal matter—the seller's response to factors not
peculiar to one customer—or was a concession to favored customers."
A criticism which can legitimately be brought to bear on the case is that
despite all of its fine distinctions there seems, in effect, to be a fusion of sub-
sections (a) and (c), thereby greatly diluting the effect of subsection (c).
Whether this unfortunate tendency actually is present will depend on the use
of Thomasville in future decisions involving subsection (c) violations."'
PAUL E. D'HEDOUVILLE
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Meeting Competition.—
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC.'—Sunshine Biscuits manufactures and
distributes baked goods on a nation-wide scale, and in the Cleveland
area it sells potato chips to independent retail outlets by way of its Velvet-
Krun-Chee Division. In 1959 competing local distributors offered discount
prices to some of Sunshine's Cleveland customers and Sunshine responded
with similar discounts. The lower prices enabled Sunshine to keep its old
customers, and were also a source of new business from customers who had
not previously purchased from Sunshine. The Federal Trade Commission
issued a complaint against Sunshine showing that its discriminatory prices
had injured competition as prohibited by Section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act." At a subsequent hearing the examiner found the Commission's
27 Rowe, supra note 6.
28 Brief for Respondent, p. 24.
29 80 Cong. Rec. 9417 (1936): "There is no limit to the phases of production, sale
and distribution in which such improvements may be devised . . . nor from which those
[improvements] . . . when demonstrated may be expressed in price differentials in favor
of the particular customers whose distinctive methods of purchase . . . makes them
possible."
10 Brief for Petitioner, p. 5: "This has been the practice as far back as anyone
presently with the company can recall."
31 It is somewhat significant to note that FTC did not apply for certiorari.
1 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.	 13(a) (1958).
Section 2(a) of the act, as amended, provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
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